Christophe Fouquet, who assumed the role of chief executive at Dutch semiconductor equipment manufacturer ASML in 2024 after more than a decade with the company, expressed confidence in the firm’s unassailable market position during an interview at the Milken Institute Global Conference in Beverly Hills. Speaking on Tuesday, Fouquet indicated that no competitor currently poses a credible threat to ASML’s dominance in extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography systems—the critical machines that etch microscopic circuit patterns onto semiconductor wafers for the world’s most advanced processors.
ASML’s control of the EUV lithography market represents one of the most pronounced monopolies in global technology infrastructure. The company supplies the only commercially viable EUV machines to chipmakers worldwide, a position worth billions annually as semiconductor manufacturers from Taiwan to South Korea to the United States depend entirely on ASML’s equipment to produce cutting-edge processors. This technological chokepoint has made ASML central to geopolitical tensions surrounding chip supply chains, with governments from Washington to Beijing seeking either to secure supply or circumvent it through alternative technologies.
Fouquet’s assertion that competitors cannot realistically challenge ASML’s dominance reflects the extraordinary technical and capital barriers that protect the Dutch company’s market position. Developing functional EUV lithography systems requires mastery of physics, optical engineering, and precision manufacturing at scales that only a handful of organizations globally have attempted. The research and development investment necessary—often measured in billions of dollars across decades—has deterred all but the most determined competitors. China’s SMIC and comparable efforts by other nations have made incremental progress in advanced chip manufacturing, yet none have successfully deployed working EUV systems at commercial scale.
The company’s monopoly extends beyond mere technical superiority. ASML benefits from decades of accumulated expertise, proprietary knowledge embedded in its workforce, established relationships with chipmakers, and supply chain advantages that newcomers cannot quickly replicate. Customers including Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), Samsung Electronics, and Intel have built their manufacturing strategies around ASML equipment, creating switching costs that lock suppliers into dependence. Additionally, international export controls—particularly those imposed by the Dutch government in coordination with the United States—have been weaponized to prevent technology transfer to competitors or unfriendly nations.
The geopolitical dimensions of ASML’s monopoly intensify scrutiny on the company’s position. The United States has pressed the Netherlands to restrict ASML’s sales to China, citing national security concerns about advanced chip manufacturing capabilities. China, meanwhile, has accelerated domestic R&D efforts to develop indigenous EUV alternatives, viewing reliance on ASML as a strategic vulnerability. These pressures complicate ASML’s commercial interests while raising questions about how long any single company can maintain such a concentrated grip on essential infrastructure in an era of technological competition between major powers.
Fouquet’s confidence may be warranted in the near term, yet technological history suggests that no monopoly remains permanently invulnerable. Alternative lithography approaches—including extreme-ultraviolet variants, next-generation techniques, or entirely novel manufacturing paradigms—could eventually emerge. Japanese firms dominated semiconductor equipment markets decades ago before losing ground. Intel held a processor monopoly before AMD and others eroded it. ASML’s current invulnerability should be understood as durable but not eternal, particularly if geopolitical pressure incentivizes sustained alternative development programs backed by state resources.
Looking forward, ASML’s monopoly will likely persist throughout the remainder of this decade and possibly beyond. The company’s technology trajectory, capital reserves, and entrenched market position provide substantial defensive advantages. However, the company operates in an environment where governments view semiconductor equipment as strategically critical infrastructure. Regulatory pressure, export controls, and coordinated international R&D efforts aimed at developing competing technologies represent long-term strategic risks that no technical superiority can entirely eliminate. Fouquet’s confidence in ASML’s competitive position may prove correct, yet the geopolitical forces reshaping semiconductor supply chains could ultimately impose constraints on the company’s market freedom that transcend purely technological competition.
