Iran has increasingly relied on its ability to threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic deterrent against military intervention, reducing its dependency on nuclear weapons development as a geopolitical tool, according to Donald Heflin, a senior fellow at Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
The Strait of Hormuz, a 21-mile-wide waterway between Iran and Oman, serves as one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints. Approximately 21 percent of global petroleum passes through the strait daily, making it central to international energy security. Iran’s geographic position gives it unprecedented leverage over global oil markets and the economies of nations reliant on Middle Eastern crude exports. This geographic advantage has fundamentally altered Tehran’s strategic calculus regarding deterrence mechanisms.
Heflin’s assessment reflects a significant shift in how Iran has approached regional security over the past decade. Rather than pursuing an intensive nuclear weapons program as its primary deterrent—a path that has invited sustained international sanctions and military threats—Iran has demonstrated that conventional maritime capabilities and the threat of disrupting global energy flows constitute a more effective and immediately deployable deterrent. This strategy avoids the costly infrastructure investments and international isolation associated with nuclear weapons development while providing tangible, immediate leverage.
The strategic value of controlling the Strait hinges on Iran’s demonstrated willingness to act. In 2019, Iranian forces attacked Saudi Arabian oil facilities, temporarily disrupting global oil supplies and sending prices surging. More recently, Iran has conducted naval exercises and periodic threats to close the strait in response to international pressure and sanctions. These actions underscore Tehran’s capacity to rapidly escalate tensions and inflict economic damage on adversaries without crossing the threshold that would trigger a full-scale military response from the United States or regional allies.
For the United States and its allies, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel, Iran’s control of the strait represents a persistent security concern. Any blockade or prolonged disruption would devastate global energy markets, destabilize allied economies, and shift geopolitical advantage toward Tehran. Conversely, Iran benefits from the mere threat of disruption—it need not actually close the strait to extract concessions or deter military action. This asymmetric leverage has proven more valuable politically than the uncertainty and vulnerability that would accompany a nuclear weapons program.
The implications for international negotiations are substantial. In previous nuclear talks, Iran’s potential nuclear capability was the central bargaining chip. However, if Iran views conventional maritime deterrence as equally or more effective, negotiations become more complex. Sanctions designed to force Iranian compliance on nuclear matters may prove less persuasive if Iran can offset economic losses through energy market manipulation and the geopolitical leverage that provides. This dynamic suggests that any future diplomatic settlement must account for Iran’s maritime advantages and not rely solely on nuclear constraints as the foundation of deterrence.
Heflin’s analysis also carries implications for regional arms races. Gulf states and Israel may accelerate military spending to protect shipping lanes, develop anti-ship capabilities, and establish alternative energy infrastructure to reduce Hormuz dependency. The United States may increase naval presence in the region, raising the risk of miscalculation or accidental escalation. Meanwhile, China and other major energy importers face growing incentives to engage diplomatically with Iran to ensure uninterrupted energy supplies.
Looking forward, Iran’s strategic emphasis on maritime deterrence will likely shape regional dynamics for years. Any future crisis—whether triggered by sanctions escalation, Israeli military action, or proxy conflicts—will immediately implicate Hormuz security and global energy prices. This reality has effectively elevated Iran’s bargaining position while reducing the relative importance of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. International policymakers must increasingly reckon with Iran’s geographic advantages as a permanent feature of Middle Eastern geopolitics, requiring sustained diplomatic engagement and creative solutions to manage the risks inherent in such critical strategic dependency.
