Prospects for renewed Iran-United States diplomatic engagement hinge on a narrow set of preconditions that neither side has yet fully committed to meeting, according to analysis from political scientist Mohsen Milani and former White House official Elisa Ewers. The two experts outlined in recent discussions the structural barriers, negotiating positions, and potential pathways that could determine whether talks on Iran’s nuclear program and regional tensions advance or stall indefinitely.
The Iran-US relationship has been defined by successive cycles of confrontation and negotiation since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—the landmark nuclear accord—collapsed after the United States unilaterally withdrew in 2018 under the Trump administration. Subsequent Iranian escalation of uranium enrichment, combined with regional proxy conflicts and cyber tensions, have left both nations locked in a standoff that successive administrations have struggled to break. The geopolitical stakes extend far beyond bilateral relations: any Iran-US deal shapes Middle Eastern security architecture, oil markets, and the balance of power from the Persian Gulf to the Levant.
Milani, who has closely studied Iranian decision-making for decades, emphasized that Iranian leadership requires tangible security guarantees and economic relief before meaningfully constraining nuclear activities. The Iranian position reflects deep institutional distrust of American intentions, rooted in historical grievances including the 1953 CIA-backed coup and decades of sanctions. Conversely, Ewers, drawing on her experience in White House negotiations, outlined the American prerequisite: verifiable Iranian compliance with strict limits on uranium enrichment, unfettered International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, and curbs on ballistic missile development. These foundational demands remain fundamentally misaligned.
The economic dimension proves equally complex. Iran’s economy has contracted under successive waves of sanctions imposed since 2018, with oil exports severely restricted and banking systems isolated from global financial networks. Restoring access to international markets and frozen assets could incentivize Iranian concessions. However, US domestic political opposition to removing sanctions—particularly from Congress and pro-Israel lobbies—constrains any negotiating administration’s flexibility. Ewers noted that incremental sanctions relief, phased in conjunction with Iranian compliance measures, might create sufficient momentum. Yet such sequencing requires mutual confidence-building measures that currently do not exist. Milani countered that Iranian officials view incremental relief as inadequate, demanding comprehensive sanctions removal as a precondition rather than an outcome of talks.
Regional tensions and proxy conflicts add another layer of complexity. Iran’s support for militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, alongside its backing of Hezbollah in Lebanon, features prominently in American security concerns. The US position increasingly links nuclear negotiations to broader regional behavior, while Iranian negotiators maintain that nuclear matters and regional issues are separate. This disagreement reflects divergent views on what constitutes legitimate security interests. For Iran, regional influence represents a counter to perceived American encroachment; for the US, such activities violate international norms and threaten allies including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
Both analysts identified a narrow window for diplomatic progress, though neither expressed confidence in immediate breakthroughs. Milani suggested that a new Iranian administration, depending on electoral outcomes and internal power dynamics, could potentially shift Iran’s negotiating posture if accompanied by meaningful American concessions. Ewers emphasized that sustained, back-channel diplomacy through intermediaries—potentially involving European powers, China, or the UAE—might help establish the minimal trust necessary for formal talks. Both stressed that military escalation, whether through strikes on nuclear facilities or Iranian retaliation, would render diplomacy impossible for years.
The international community watches with acute interest. European nations remain invested in preserving some form of nuclear accord. China and Russia view US-Iran escalation through the lens of their own strategic interests, with Moscow potentially seeking to use Iranian leverage in broader negotiations over Ukraine and Syria. Israel maintains that Iranian nuclear advancement threatens its existence and has signaled willingness to conduct military strikes if diplomacy fails. This complex multipolarity means any Iran-US negotiation occurs within a densely interconnected web of competing interests, third-party red lines, and shifting alliances.
Whether substantive talks resume depends ultimately on whether both nations conclude that negotiated settlement serves their interests better than continued standoff. Milani and Ewers agree that such a calculation remains elusive for Iranian and American decision-makers, each convinced the other will exploit any agreement. Without a dramatic shift in threat perception—whether through military escalation that clarifies costs, internal political change in either country, or external shocks that reorder priorities—the Iran-US impasse appears likely to persist. For now, the preconditions for success remain unmet, and the pathway forward obscured by decades of mutual suspicion and competing visions of regional order.
