A University of Oklahoma professor specializing in Middle Eastern affairs has argued that the United States is losing strategic ground in the Persian Gulf, while Israel is consolidating influence by pursuing a separate approach to Iran independent of American policy. Joshua Landis, in an interview with The Hindu, contended that President Donald Trump’s economic blockade of Iran is structurally unsustainable and will ultimately fail, even as Israel—which opposes any ceasefire with Tehran—works to pull Washington back into direct military confrontation with the Islamic Republic.
Landis’s assessment reflects deepening fissures in the US-Israel alliance regarding Iran strategy, a tension that has simmered beneath the surface of Middle Eastern geopolitics for years. The Trump administration has pursued what it calls a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran through sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Israel, meanwhile, has conducted independent military operations against Iranian assets and allied forces across Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, signaling that it will not wait for American approval or coordination before acting against what it perceives as existential threats. This divergence in tactical approach masks a more fundamental question: whether the United States can sustain its regional dominance when its closest ally in the region is increasingly charting its own course.
The professor’s argument hinges on several interconnected geopolitical realities. First, sanctions regimes lose effectiveness over time as targeted states develop alternative trade routes, find willing partners in countries unwilling to enforce American pressure, and adjust their economies to operate under constraints. Iran has already demonstrated capacity for economic adaptation through partnerships with Russia, China, and regional actors. Second, Landis suggested that Israel’s strategy—deterrence through military action rather than negotiated settlement—creates an unstable equilibrium that the United States cannot indefinitely sustain without deeper military involvement. These pressures, he implied, may eventually force Washington to choose between supporting an Israeli-driven escalation or accepting reduced influence in the Gulf.
The geopolitical stakes extend beyond US-Iran relations. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf Cooperation Council members have begun hedging their bets, maintaining security ties with Washington while simultaneously developing economic and diplomatic relationships with China and Russia. This diversification accelerates whenever Middle Eastern stability appears threatened. A renewed US-Iran conflict would likely push Gulf states further toward strategic ambiguity, weakening the informal security architecture that has underpinned American influence in one of the world’s most consequential regions for energy security and global trade flows. The Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states, depend partly on the assumption that Israel’s security concerns can be addressed without region-wide destabilization. A major escalation risks unraveling those agreements.
Israel’s position in this calculation is paradoxical. By operating independently against Iranian targets, Israel strengthens its deterrent capacity and demonstrates credible military capability—assets that enhance its leverage. However, this same independent action potentially isolates it diplomatically from Arab partners who signed the Abraham Accords partly to avoid being dragged into open conflict with Iran. The corollary for the United States is equally complex: continued support for Israeli military operations risks deeper entanglement in the region, yet distancing itself from Israel would damage the alliance that serves as a cornerstone of American Middle Eastern strategy. Landis’s framing suggests this is a strategic bind without easy resolution.
The sustainability question also touches upon American domestic politics and resource allocation. Two decades of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have exhausted American appetite for open-ended Middle Eastern military commitments. The stated American pivot toward great power competition with China and Russia suggests limited appetite for major new regional conflicts. Yet if escalation pressures intensify—whether through Israeli military action, Iranian miscalculation, or proxy group activity—the United States may find itself drawn into conflict despite these domestic constraints. Landis appeared to be arguing that current policy trajectories are mathematically unstable and will eventually force a reckoning.
The academic’s perspective carries weight given his long career studying Syria and the broader Levantine region, though his interpretations remain contested among other Middle East scholars. Some analysts argue that Iran’s own economic constraints and internal vulnerabilities make it unlikely to initiate major escalation, thereby preserving space for American-led diplomacy. Others suggest that Israel’s demonstrated military superiority provides sufficient deterrence without requiring American escalation. Nevertheless, the fundamental question Landis raises—whether the United States can maintain Gulf dominance while its closest regional ally pursues an increasingly independent strategy—will shape Middle Eastern geopolitics for years ahead. How Washington and Jerusalem negotiate this divergence, whether through formal coordination mechanisms or implicit understanding, may ultimately determine whether American influence in the Gulf expands, stabilizes, or continues its apparent decline.
